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REVISIONISM MISPLACED: WHY TIDS IS
NOT THE TIME TO BURY AUTONOMY
David J. Rothman*
THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, D OCTORS, AND MEDI
CAL D ECISIONS. By Carl E. Schneider. New York: Oxford Univer
sity Press. 1998. Pp. xxii, 307. $39.95.
For the past twenty years, bioethics has exerted a profound in
fluence on American medicine. Although its full impact cannot be
precisely measured, one need only speak to European physicians
and clinical investigators to grasp the full extent of the change.
Americans may debate the sufficiency of the information that phy
sicians share with their patients, but hear a European doctor ex
claim angrily that it is criminal to ask a woman to decide whether to
have a radical mastectomy or lumpectomy, and you know that
bioethics has made a significant difference in the United States. So
too, Americans, far more intensely than Europeans, will fiercely
contest any proposed exception to informed consent in research
protocols, and our Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) are un
matched for the protections they provide human subjects.1
Not only foreign comparisons but daily events point to the dif
ference that bioethics has made: consider the newspaper space de
voted to bioethical considerations, whether the case be multiple
births, AIDS testing in Africa, cloning, or organ donation, to
choose recent examples; or the readiness of lawyers to have clients
sign an advanced directive and proxy assignment; or the intensity of
public debate on physician-assisted suicide. Bioethics has clearly
become the stuff of referendum campaigns and dinner-table
discussions.
To be sure, bioethics did not enter a vacuum. A powerful tradi
tion of medical ethics goes back at least as far as Hippocrates.2 But
the two frameworks are dramatically different. For one, medical
ethics was internal to the profession - physicians generally wrote
* Bernard Schoenberg Professor of Social Medicine and Director of the Center for the
Study of Society and Medicine at the Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons. B.A.
1958, Columbia College; Ph.D. 1964, Harvard University. Professor Rothman is author of
Strangers at the Bedside: How Law and Ethics Transformed Medical Decision Making; and
Beginnings Count: The Technological Imperative in American Health Care. -Ed.
1. See THE Erarcs OF REsEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (Harold Y. Vanderpool
ed., 1996).
2. See Robert Baker, The History of Medical Ethics, in COMPANION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TiiE HISTORY OF MEDICINE 852-57 (W.F. Bynum & R. Porter eds., 1993).
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and read the salient texts. For another, medical ethics tended to
focus on doctor-doctor relationships, not doctor-patient relation
ships. The early professional codes seem more intent on teaching
etiquette than ethics - the most egregious transgression was to
steal a colleague's patient. Ethical dilemmas at the bedside were
resolved by the individual physician with little formal consultation
with colleagues, let alone patients, and without a written record.
The physician alone, and on his own, decided whether this case of
pneumonia was the old man's best friend and should be left un
treated. Finally, the principle of beneficence underpinned all of
medical ethics. Physicians' concern for their patients' well-being,
along with physicians' superior knowledge, rendered them better
able to decide for patients than the patients themselves.
Beginning in the 1960s, and with mounting strength thereafter,
bioethics altered each of these aspects of the tradition of medical
ethics. Outsiders to medicine - lawyers as well as philosophers pronounced on medical decisions, attentive to every nuance of
practice and ready to tell doctors what to do or not to do. At the
same time, decisionmaking on ethical issues became collective, evi
denced by the emergence of IRBs and hospital ethics committees.
It also became formal, that is, subjected to state and federal regula
tions and requiring written and signed forms, as in the case of "Do
Not Resuscitate" orders.3 Perhaps most notably, patient autonomy
became the guiding principle for decisionmaking. It was the old
man who was now to decide whether the pneumonia was or was not
his best friend. In effect, what had once been seen as beneficence
came to be regarded as paternalism.
Although few would dispute the accuracy of this general sketch,
one particular question is now very open to debate: Have Ameri
cans gone overboard in their dedication to the values of patient au
tonomy? Restated, have we replaced the tyranny of physician
beneficence with a tyranny of patient autonomy? Have we let the
letter of the law override the spirit? In the name of advancing the
self-determination of patients have we imposed unreasonable and
ultimately wrongheaded duties and obligations on them?
This is the central question that Carl Schneider4 addresses in
The Practice of Autonomy, bringing to bear on it an exceptionally
wide-ranging knowledge not only of law and bioethics but the social
sciences as well. He has read widely in the relevant literature and
comes away persuaded of the limits of the bioethics paradigm both
in practice and in theory. His book is at once analytic and argu
mentative, building a case but sprinkling it with deprecatory asides.
3. See DAYID J. RoTHMAN, STRANGERS AT nm BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAw AND
BIOETiilCS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 101-246 (1991).

4. Professor of Law and Internal Medicine, University of Michigan.
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He announces at the outset that he is writing "against the grain,"
against "conventional bioethics wisdom" (p. xiii) , which places ex
cessive reliance on patient autonomy. He, a self-styled contrarian,
claims to argue from the patient's point of view and promises to
move us beyond "present pieties" (p. xiv) by demonstrating that
patients want both more and less than autonomy. The tone is often
grating, but the critical question is how well he succeeds.
Bioethics, Schneider contends, has endowed autonomy with
such import as to make it "mandatory." Although the principle
should remain central to medical decisionmaking, it has become
"wooden," "simplistic," and "extravagant" (p. 33). It presumes a
"hyper-rational" patient who, in a disembodied, abstract, coldly an
alytic, and bloodless fashion, calculates the advantages and disad
vantages of one or another medical strategy, juxtaposes personal
values against anticipated outcomes, and reaches a decision. But
such is not the way of patients, Schneider insists. Quoting at length
from poll data, sociological surveys, and the burgeoning literature
of patient memoirs, he assembles examples of patients who did not
want to make their own decisions. These patients, devastated by
their diseases, sought guidance from doctors, and yes, were ready to
take their advice on particular decisions. He also describes, in very
effective fashion, the barriers to giving truly informed consent when
suffering from major illness, medicated, and lying in a hospital bed.
Schneider's construction of the hyper-rationalist is familiar we have met him before, albeit only in economic texts. There he
takes the form of "economic man," who maximizes self-interest and
utility, discounts all present and future benefits against present and
future costs, and then invests, or expends, in cool and calculating
fashion. Apparently, the bioethicists have brought him to medicine.
The Hastings Institute and Georgetown have joined with the
University of Chicago.
But the alliance seems illusory, and one wonders whether
Schneider has invented a straw man. Most of his references to the
hyper-rationalist, mandatory autonomy position come from would
be critics, not from advocates. In fact, I myself know of no one who
pronounces him or herself in favor of such an approach. Thus, Dan
Brock, who himself favors an "optional" model of autonomy - one
in which the patient is entitled, but not required, to be active in
medical decisionmaking - describes a "mandatory model" that
compels people to make decisions.5 Schneider quotes Brock to
document the reality of the mandatory autonomy school; Brock,
however, is staking out a theoretical position, not critiquing an ac
tual bioethicist. Schneider puts into the "optional" camp such lead5. See Dan W. Brock, The Ideal of Shared Decision Making Between Physicians and Pa·
tients, 1 J. KENNEDY INST. ETHICS 28 {1991).
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ing bioethicists as Tom Beauchamp and James Childress and
includes within it as well the autonomy position set forth by the
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems.6 So do
hyper-rationalists really exist? The individual often invoked by
Schneider, and this is the book's own distortion, is Jay Katz, a phy
sician who has taught for many years at Yale Law School. In his
1984 book, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, Katz was so
eager to stimulate_ a dialogue between the two that he did, at times,
exaggerate the need for patients to serve as decisionmakers.7 But
Katz, as important as he is, does not constitute a school, let alone a
movement. Schneider cites still other bioethicists, including Wil
liam Bartholome and Robert Veatch, but again they seem to be
more in favor of enhancing patient-doctor dialogue than of saddling
individual patients with unwanted autonomy.8
Schneider is no more convincing in identifying instances of
mandatory autonomy in patient narratives. To buttress his case, he
tells the story of a patient, Daniel Cohodes, whose doctor
·

laid out the facts, shared the research literature, conducted computer
searches on my behalf, and made certain that I sought appropriate
outside expertise when necessary. It was painful at times, both for me
and for him. The result is that I feel and believe that I am a full
partner in any and all treatment decisions. [p. 15]

It is difficult, however, to see this as a coercive imposition of
mandatory autonomy rather than as a wonderful example of a com
mitted physician trying to educate and empower his patient.
Indeed, Schneider is so insistent on showing the drawbacks of
mandatory autonomy that he goes out of his way to illustrate the
seeming costs of a more general exercise of autonomy; in the pro
cess, he finds himself in very odd positions. At some points, he
exaggerates the benefits of trusting doctors. So we learn that we
often "enlist doctors to help get ourselves to do what we should" (p.
87). But as an example he cites an author who claims that when
doctors order patients to stop smoking, "they do so more reliably
and more comfortably" (p. 87). As anyone familiar with the recidi
vism rates among smokers knows well, such a claim has the most
limited validity. Campaigns to stop smoking would be far more ef
fective if all that was required was a doctor's order.
6. See ToM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
(3d ed. 1989); PRESIDENT'S CoMMN. FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, REP. No. 46, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS
(1982).
7. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
8. See William G. Bartholome, A Revolution in Understanding 18 QuALITY REv. BULL. 6,
10 (1992); Robert M. Veatch, Abandoning Informed Consent, IiAsTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.
Apr. 1995, at 5, 9.
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In a similar vein, Schneider devotes considerable space to a cri
tique of individual independence and a defense of dependence. He
argues, on the basis of a handful of patient narratives, that individ
ual independence works to subvert personal intimacy and fosters
isolation. But there is no necessary connection between wanting to
share fully in medical decisionmaking and, as Schneider claims,
foreclosing friendship, forsaking reassurance, and, in a bizarre
stretch of argument, being unwilling to accept a kidney donation
from a relative (pp. 163-65).
Schneider's insistence that contemporary bioethics overburdens
patients and that consent has turned into a hammer to bludgeon
patients leads him to contend that we should now back off a dedica
tion to autonomy in order to correct a deplorable imbalance. But
without doubting that at times and in places some physicians might
put too much of an onus on patients, and that some patients may be
happier leaving decisionmaking to doctors, I cannot think of a
worse time to retreat from a fundamental emphasis on autonomy.
There are several reasons why.
First, the technical expertise of the physician is much greater
than the patient's knowledge. Despite the world of internet patient
chat groups, web sites, countless books for every known disease,
and the weekly edition of the New England Journal of Medicine
online, the odds remain strong that even well-informed patients will
still do more listening than dictating.
Second, although I and many others spend significant hours in
medical school teaching the need to foster dialogue and work with
patients to obtain consent, it remains an uphill battle. I know of no
medical school curriculum in which students spend as much time
learning how to convey information as how to obtain information.
The patient interview course is taught from one perspective: how
to get patients to tell doctors what doctors want to know, not how
to train doctors to tell patients what patients want to know.
Third, it is by no means clear what types of medical choices
drive Schneider's argument. Late in the book, he lays out a grid
that moves from technical decisions to preferential decisions; he
also maps types of decisions, from one-time to continuous, and
from treatment of potentially fatal diseases to ordinary diseases (ch.
4). He acknowledges the attraction of concluding that patients
should make value choices and doctors technical choices, but aptly
recognizes the difficulty - the impossibility - of maintaining the
distinction in practice. Further, this sophisticated analysis is not
well integrated into the overall presentation. Nowhere are these
important differentiations brought to bear directly on the question
of autonomy and decisionmaking.
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Nor are we ever certain just how many patients are unhappy
with the autonomy model, who they are, and how these differences
should be reconciled. In whose interest are we to make policy? At
times, Schneider concedes that he is worrying about a minority. At
other times, it seems that the mandatory autonomy school is tram
pling over everyone's preferences. He acknowledges that "patients
largely wish[ ] to be informed about medical circumstances," but "a
substantial number of them do not want to make their own medical
decisions, or perhaps even to participate in those decisions" (p. 41).
Yet, he leaves the reader to parse out what is "largely" versus a
"substantial number" and how these differences should be
balanced.
Schneider does note that decisionmaking preferences vary sig
nificantly by class, age, and gender. Younger, well-educated women
are far more likely to want both information and decisionmaking
responsibility than older men and women with less means and less
education. He contends, not unreasonably, that older patients mak
ing life and death choices are least likely to follow an autonomy
model. But what he does not do is parse out the implications of this
complexity for policy or education. Do we really want different
standards of information sharing or consent, one for men and an
other for women? Or for those above or below 65? Or for those
with advanced disease as against self-limiting disease? For patients
with chronic disease as compared to acute disease? How should
law, bioethics, and medical education differentiate between the
need to respect the wishes of the young, well-educated woman who
is determined to make treatment choices for her breast cancer and
the less well-educated older woman who may want to leave these
decisions to the surgeon? These are anything but trivial issues, and
we need more guidance than his critique of mandatory autonomy
provides.
Schneider's closing pages on the bureaucratization of medicine
and the impact of bioethics are limp and unpersuasive. He recog
nizes that under managed care and team-based medicine, patients
are losing authority to organizations as well as to physicians (pp.
186-95). Indeed, physicians are losing authority to the organiza
tions that employ them, be they hospitals or HMOs. Although in
his "against the grain" outlook, Schneider is not eager to condemn
all aspects of bureaucratization, he does acknowledge that medicine
today has the "impersonality of strangers" (p. 200). Patients and
doctors do not choose each other, know each other, or stay with
each other. But, however ready he is to fault bureaucracies for
these outcomes, he is still more relentless in his critique of
bioethics. Even more than for-profit managed care companies, it is
responsible for the quagmire; bioethics ideology, apparently, is
more powerful than the pocketbook. Because of bioethics' empha-
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sis on autonomy and information sharing, it has seemingly become
"easier for doctors to distance themselves from patients and to shed
the psychic and moral burdens" that physicians once assumed (p.
205). Surely the indictment is exaggerated and is based on no more
than a few anecdotes. In all events, Schneider and his readers are
still left with the dilemma of how to proceed. Is this the time to
abandon or reinvigorate principles of autonomy?
Schneider, ready to abandon them, looks for alternative answers
in two distinct arenas. First, he champions the idea of guidelines. If
only we had clear standards, in his examples, that emphasized the
need for pain relief, for medical screening, and for end-of-life care,
then doctors would know better what to do; further, patients would
have valuable reference points that would reduce the burdens of
choice. But Schneider forgoes a discussion of who is to compose
the guidelines; surely HMOs, medical organizations, physician spe
cialists, and consumer groups would be likely to provide very differ
ent content. Nor does he address whether guidelines would be
effective in this new era. There is good reason to think not. After
all, there are already existing guidelines on pain relief but no
palliative-care specialist I know believes that they are being fol
lowed.9 And the same could be said of guidelines on medical
screening and end-of-life decisions.
Rather than contend with these issues, Schneider closes his
book with ten rules that are intended to enhance the place of kind
ness within medicine. Almost all of them, however, involve medical
etiquette and not medical ethics. We have come full circle, with
Schneider relying on manners rather than addressing power. Rule
1 for doctors: do not keep people waiting. Rule 2: respect privacy.
Rule 3: introduce yourself to strangers. Rule 4: grant other adults
the same courtesy in titles you accord yourself. His rules go on to
urge saying "please" and "thank-you" and returning your phone
calls (pp. 221-26).
Confronting the enlarged authority of managed care corpora
tions that take their messages from their corporate clients, share
holders, and cost-conscious government officials (as in managed
Medicare and Medicaid), no advocate for patient well-being can be
confident of which protests or reform strategies will work best.
These are times that make the most avid proponent of rights hum
ble. After confronting a critique like Schneider's and reckoning
with his solutions, pondering the arguments against autonomy and
the potential of good manners to change structure, I, for one, am
more prepared to invest in a rights-oriented movement, in patient
and consumer proactivity and not dependence, and in patient au-

9.

See INSTITUTE OF MEo., APPROACHING DEATII: IMPROVING CARE AT TIIE END OF

LIFE 335 (1997).
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tonomy, albeit optional rather than mandated. When physicians
must see patients on a ten-minute schedule, and when financial con
flict of interest is more acute now in medicine than ever before, I do
not think it wise, in individual or policy terms, to worry about an
excess of reliance on patient decisionmaking. Indeed, I cannot
think of a worse time to champion the idea of passive patients.

It is not just managed care but the intrinsic character of medical
progress that makes me so critical of Schneider's approach. There
is every reason to assume that trade-offs in medical decisions are
going to become more weighty than before. In almost all arenas,
the progress in technique, skill, and capacity grows exponentially,
both in terms of diagnostics and treatment. How far down the diag
nostic road do we as individuals want to travel? As the power of
genetic tools becomes greater - encompassing not only compara
tively rare cases of fatal diseases such as Huntington's, but the more
common cases of breast cancer, to say nothing of future capacities
to diagnose heart disease, hypertension, or obesity - is the first
and most critical message to patients to trust the genetic specialists?
Is this truly the moment to worry about the perils of over-informing
patients? With therapeutic interventions becoming more powerful,
with transplant surgery long having broken the fifty-year-old bar
rier, with responsible surgeons ready to perform cardiac bypass or
hip replacement surgery on men and women in their nineties, is the
vital message to transmit one of excessive patient commitment to
autonomy?
To put it most bluntly, Schneider's book is not one I would rush
to put in an elder hostel or medical school curriculum, or give to
legislators to ponder. Yes, some bioethicists should read it to make
certain their normative statements on doctor-patient relationships
are not exaggerated, and sociologists will profit from its intelligent
discussion of the patient literature. But I think we need more, not
fewer, books that instruct us carefully and precisely on how to pro
tect and assert our own values and interests in the doctor's office.

